The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) has filed an appeal against the judgment delivered on 5 May 2026 by the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, which awarded ₦100 million in damages in favour of officials of the Department of State Services (DSS), a judgment SERAP considers to be “a travesty and a miscarriage of justice.”
The appeal, filed last Friday, 8 May 2026, by Tayo Oyetibo, SAN, on behalf of SERAP, is accompanied by an application seeking a stay of execution of the judgment pending the determination of the appeal, challenging what SERAP describes as “a legally flawed decision resulting in a miscarriage of justice.”
SERAP said, “the Notice of Appeal already filed will be amended upon receipt of the Certified True Copy of the judgment to incorporate key portions of the judgment that further highlight its flawed nature. Pending this, the appeal and the accompanying application for stay of execution already filed and served provide adequate legal protection for our organisation.”
Justice Yusuf Halilu had in his judgment last week ordered SERAP to pay ₦100 million in damages to the DSS officials for alleged defamation, issue public apologies, pay ₦1 million in litigation costs, and a 10 percent annual post-judgment interest on the damages until fully paid.
In its Notice of Appeal, SERAP is arguing that “the decision rests on fundamental legal and evidential errors that go to the root of jurisdiction and fairness in adjudication. The court’s decision is therefore perverse and a nullity.”
SERAP said, “the trial court relied on defective evidence, including a witness statement that was not sworn before a Commissioner for Oaths, which ought to have been discountenanced. The court’s reliance on such evidence substantially affected the outcome of the case.”
SERAP is therefore asking the Court of Appeal for: “an order allowing the appeal; an order setting aside the entire judgment of the High Court of the FCT delivered on 5 May 2026; and an order dismissing the substantive suit (CV/4547/2024) in its entirety for lacking merit.”
SERAP is arguing that, “the appeal is not merely about the outcome of the case, but about whether a court can validly sustain proceedings founded on a defective originating process, or impose liability where the legal thresholds for defamation have not been met.”
According to SERAP, “the judgment is legally defective, procedurally flawed, and unsupported by evidence, raising substantial questions of jurisdiction, defamation law, and constitutional and international fair trial standards.”
SERAP is arguing that, “the court failed to apply the well-established objective test in defamation law, relying instead on subjective perceptions within the DSS rather than the understanding of ordinary members of the public.”
SERAP’s Notice of Appeal, read in part: “the lower court erred in law when it allowed the amendment of the Writ of Summons to substitute the name of a non-juristic person with a juristic person.”
“Particulars Of Error: the Respondents instituted this action at the trial Court by initially filing a Writ of Summons against the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project, a non-juristic person. The Respondents amended their Writ of Summons to substitute the said non-juristic entity with the Incorporated Trustees of the Socio-Economic Rights And Accountability Project.”
“An action commenced against a non-juristic person is fundamentally defective and does not constitute a misnomer which is capable of amendment. An amendment cannot cure a void originating process nor effect the substitution of a distinct juristic entity for a party that does not exist in law.”
“The decision of the lower court was reached on a misapplication of the relevant legal principles on juristic personality. The lower court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the Respondents’ suit against SERAP.”
“The lower court erred in law in holding that the words complained of were published of and concerning the Claimants personally, contrary to the established objective test for identification in the tort of defamation.”
“Particulars Of Error: the lower court failed to apply the objective test laid down by the Supreme Court in Ologe v. New Africa Holdings Ltd and Abalaka v. Akinsete, which requires that words be understood as referring to the claimant by right-thinking members of society generally, not by a specialised or institutional group.”
“The lower court erroneously relied on the subjective perception of the Respondents and their colleagues within the Department of State Services (the ‘DSS’).“
“The lower court failed to consider the admission of the 1st Respondent under cross examination that she is not the only tall, dark-skinned, large woman in the DSS, and that the 2nd Respondent is not the only slim, dark-skinned man.”
“The publications complained of did not mention the Respondents by name, rank, photograph, or any unique identifier. The lower court failed to consider the pre-action letter from the DSS, wherein the DSS acknowledged that the publications were made of and concerning the DSS as an institution, not the individual Respondents, as Claimants.”
“The lower court erred in law by relying on the witness statement on oath of the 1st Respondent when the 1st Respondent admitted under cross-examination that the said statement was not sworn before a Commissioner for Oaths.”
“Particulars Of Error: the law is settled that a witness statement on oath must be signed by the deponent in the presence of the person authorised to administer oaths, failing which the deposition shall be discountenanced.”
“The 1st Respondent admitted under cross-examination on 21st March 2025 that her witness statement on oath was signed in her lawyer’s chambers and not before the Commissioner for Oaths.”
“Despite the 1st Respondent’s admission, the lower court failed to strike out or discountenance the 1st Respondent’s witness statement on oath for being defective.”
“The lower court relied on the defective witness statement on oath in delivering judgment against SERAP. The defective nature of the 1st Respondent’s witness statement on oath constitutes a fundamental flaw which goes to the substance of the evidence. The lower court’s decision is perverse and a nullity.”
“The lower court erred in law by failing to uphold SERAP’s defences of justification, qualified privilege, and fair comment.”
“Particulars Of Error: SERAP gave evidence that the publications was substantially true, with respect to an unannounced visit by DSS officers, concealment of identity (including signing a false name “Sarah David” in Exhibit D4), refusal to show identification, and conduct that caused apprehension among SERAP’s staff.”
“There was also evidence that the publications were made by SERAP on an occasion of qualified privilege to inform the public about actions of state security agencies that reasonably appear intrusive and intimidating.”
“The lower court failed to apply the broad latitude afforded to fair comment on matters of public interest, including the principle that even gross exaggeration does not, of itself, render a comment unfair.”
“The lower court wrongly implied malice despite the absence of any evidence of malice on the part of SERAP. The lower court’s decision is perverse.”
“The lower court erred in law in awarding damages in favour of the Respondents despite their failure to prove any actual harm, reputational injury, or financial loss attributable to the publications.”
“Particulars Of Error: the Respondents did not adduce evidence of any suspension, investigation, disciplinary proceedings, or professional setback allegedly caused by the publications.”
“The Respondents called no witness from the general public or any right thinking member of society to testify that the publications were understood to refer personally to the Claimants or that their reputations had been lowered thereby.”
“The Respondents admitted in their pleadings before the lower court that they sued in their personal capacities and not as representatives of the DSS, yet their entire claim for damages was founded on internal DSS knowledge, which is not actionable in defamation. The lower court’s decision is perverse.”
“The lower court erred in law in holding that the Respondents had the requisite locus standi to maintain an action for defamation against SERAP in their personal capacities.”
“Particulars Of Error: the Respondents admitted that they instituted the action in their personal capacities and were not representing the DSS in the suit. However, the Respondents’ case on identification was predicated solely on assertions that staff of the DSS understood the publications to refer to them.”
“The lower court failed to apply the settled principle of law that an individual member of a large class, body, or institution cannot maintain an action for defamation unless the words complained of, clearly and specifically identify that individual.”
“The DSS is a large institution, and the words complained of did not specifically, directly, or uniquely identify the Respondents.”
“The Respondents had no locus standi to maintain an action against SERAP. The lower court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Respondents’ action.”
“The lower court erred in law by failing to properly evaluate the totality of the evidence adduced by the parties, thereby arriving at findings and conclusions that are perverse and unsupported by the record.”
“Particulars Of Error: the lower court failed to consider and give weight to material admissions made by the Respondents. The lower court disregarded the uncontroverted and unchallenged evidence adduced by SERAP.”
“The lower court failed to properly evaluate and ascribe probative value to Exhibits D1- D5. The decision of the lower court was against the weight of evidence. The decision of the lower court occasioned a miscarriage of justice.”
In its application for stay of execution, SERAP is seeking “an order staying the execution/enforcement of the Orders made in the judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, delivered by Justice Yusuf Halilu, on 5th May, 2026, by whatever means, pending the final determination of the appeal at the Court of Appeal, filed by SERAP against that Judgment.”
SERAP is also seeking “an order of injunction restraining the Claimants/Respondents from enforcing the Orders made in the judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, delivered by Justice Yusuf Halilu on 5th May, 2026, by whatever means, pending the final determination of the appeal at the Court of Appeal, filed by SERAP against that Judgment.”
SERAP’s application for stay of execution, read in part: “The effect of the decision of the Court is that the operations of SERAP, Nigeria’s foremost accountability non-profit organisation committed to the promotion of human rights, rule of law, transparency, and accountability in governance, will be severely disrupted, if not entirely shut down.”
“If this judgment is executed, it would potentially cripple SERAP’s operations. Consequently, SERAP will be unable to meet its financial obligations to its employees, consultants, vendors, and implementing partners, with dire consequences for its continued existence and the livelihoods of those dependent on it.”
“Ongoing programme activities, including human rights interventions, investigations, and advocacy initiatives, will be abruptly halted, to the serious detriment of the communities and beneficiaries who rely on SERAP’s work.”
“Thousands of individuals and communities depend on SERAP’s work, including victims of human rights violations and beneficiaries of its advocacy, investigations, and legal interventions. Halting our operations would have far-reaching consequences for public interest work and access to justice in Nigeria.”
“SERAP is committed to pursuing the appeal diligently and in accordance with the rule of law. The case raises broader concerns about the protection of civic space, the ability of civil society organisations to operate without undue interference, and the importance of safeguarding public interest advocacy.”
“The enforcement of the judgment would deprive SERAP of its constitutional right of appeal, as it would be unable to adequately finance the prosecution of its appeal to the Court of Appeal. The balance of convenience is in favour of the granting of this application and/or making of the injunctive order sought.”
The Suit No: CV/4547/2024 was instituted by Sarah John and Gabriel Ogundele, both officials of the DSS.
