By Dr. Olisa Agbakoba SAN
I commend the President for transmitting to the National Assembly an executive Bill proposing the amendment of Section 214 of the 1999 Constitution to introduce the long-awaited state police. This is a welcome development that will, if properly implemented, enhance public security and bring law enforcement closer to the communities it serves.
Beyond the question of state police, the moment also invites a broader conversation. Having devolved policing, is it not time to consider further technical devolutions such as drivers’ licences, prisons, marriage registration, arbitration, trade regulation, registration of business names, and all other matters best suited for states and local governments, so as to relieve the federal government of responsibilities that can be more efficiently managed at the subnational level? These are reforms worth serious consideration.
However, I note the well-founded concern that state police may go the way of State Independent Electoral Commissions and local governments, institutions established with good intentions but ultimately captured by state executives and rendered ineffective. Devolution without institutional protection is reform in name only, and history has shown that where institutions lack genuine constitutional protection, they inevitably become instruments of executive power rather than servants of the people and the Constitution.
Nigeria need not look far for a tested solution. The Constitution of South Africa offers an instructive model. Chapter 9, titled “Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy,” establishes and protects a range of independent state institutions including the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission, the Electoral Commission, and the Auditor General, and crucially insulates them from executive interference. These institutions are not merely created by statute. They derive their independence directly from the Constitution itself, with security of tenure for their heads, guaranteed funding, and accountability to Parliament rather than to the executive. The result is that in South Africa, neither the President nor any provincial governor can dictate to or manipulate these critical institutions.
Nigeria should adopt this model. Critical institutions such as the Nigeria Police Force, INEC, the EFCC, the ICPC, the CBN, the National Judicial Council, the Attorney General, the Accountant General, the National Human Rights Commission, the Code of Conduct Bureau, and the Office of the Public Defender, which are currently listed under Section 153 of the 1999 Constitution as executive institutions, should be insulated from executive control and established as constitutionally protected institutions that consolidate democracy. These institutions should enjoy security of tenure, their funding should be a direct charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund, and their accountability should be under the supervision of the National Assembly or the State Houses of Assembly and not the President or any Governor.
This process has been described by Professor Ben Nwabueze as the concept of limited government, which is the principle that executive power is not at large but is constrained by independent institutions guaranteed by the Constitution. If the proposed state police framework is built on this constitutional architecture of independence and accountability, it is a welcome and progressive development. If not, if state police are simply handed to governors without these protections, they will inevitably become tools of oppression, and Nigeria will have traded one problem for a far worse one.
What we recommend is an interlocking appointment, funding, and removal process like that which governs the judiciary, in which all three arms of government play a defined and balancing role. Taking the state police as an example: the Police Service Commission would identify and recommend suitably qualified candidates to the Governor; the Governor would exercise the power of appointment; and the State House of Assembly would confirm the appointment. The same tripartite structure should govern removal, so that no single arm of government can unilaterally install or dislodge the head of the police. This architecture of shared constitutional responsibility is the surest guarantee against executive capture and the politicisation of law enforcement.
I trust that this submission will receive the attention it deserves and that the Federal Government will give serious consideration to the constitutional reforms proposed herein.
