*A 90-Day Presidential Security Reset Doctrine
By Prof. Abiola Allen
Nigeria’s insecurity is no longer a single-front war. It is a complex criminal ecosystem in which terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, farmer-herder conflict, communal violence, illegal mining, arms trafficking, drug routes, cyber-enabled fraud, oil theft, violent separatism, cultism and street-level predation reinforce one another.
In practical security terms, Nigeria is confronting a hybrid threat: part insurgency, part organized crime, part security governance failure, part economic desperation, and part intelligence-collapse problem. The seams between these threats are where the state is losing. Criminal networks do not respect state boundaries, agency mandates, or the distinction between “terrorism” and “crime.” They treat Nigeria as one operational space.
The country’s security stakeholders – the Presidency, the National Security Adviser, the Armed Forces, Police, DSS, NIA, NSCDC, EFCC, NFIU, Customs, Immigration, state governors, local governments, traditional institutions, faith leaders, civil society, private sector actors and community gatekeepers – must therefore stop treating insecurity as a series of isolated incidents.
Kidnapping in one local government may be connected to ransom laundering in a city, arms supply from a border corridor, illegal mining proceeds in another state, and compromised officials inside a security formation. The dots are connected. The failure is in connecting them in real time.
Recent public indicators confirm the depth of the crisis. The National Human Rights Commission reported 570 killings and 278 kidnappings in April 2025 alone. It also described widespread violence, displacement and rights violations in conflict-ridden states, especially Benue, Plateau, Borno and Yobe. In the humanitarian space, the World Food Programme warned that northern Nigeria could face unprecedented hunger pressure, projecting severe hunger for tens of millions, driven partly by militant attacks that keep farmers away from their land.
These realities prove that insecurity is now linked to food prices, displacement, child protection, justice, rural livelihoods and national confidence. You cannot separate a kidnapping in Kaduna from the price of garri in Lagos. You cannot separate an attack on a farm in Benue from the recruitment of a teenager into a gang in Port Harcourt.
My sincere advisory position is clear: Nigeria needs a 90-day Presidential Security Reset led by intelligence, forensic criminology, forensic accounting, community trust and operational accountability.
This is not a call for another committee. It is a call for a command doctrine. The Presidency should provide the political will, but security stakeholders must own the implementation. The public must see measurable action within 90 days, not another cycle of promises after tragedy.
The recommended doctrine is simple but demanding: One War Room. One Map. One Boss. Ten Strategies. Ninety Days of disciplined deployment.
Nigeria’s first security failure is not lack of courage among field officers. It is fragmentation at the command and intelligence level. The Army, Police, DSS, NIA, NSCDC, EFCC, NFIU, Customs, Immigration and state security outfits often see different fragments of the same threat. One agency has the phone number. Another has the bank account. A third has the GPS coordinates of a camp. None of them see the full picture. Criminals exploit these seams.
They move faster than bureaucracy, communicate across networks, and treat state boundaries as administrative inconveniences rather than operational barriers. A kidnap gang in Zamfara can receive payment in a Lagos fintech wallet, buy fuel in Niger State, and launder money through a cattle market in Oyo. By the time one agency files paperwork to request data from another, the money is gone, the victims are moved, and the gang is dispersed.
This is not a problem of technology alone. It is a problem of doctrine, incentives, and accountability. Agencies are rewarded for “owning” operations and hoarding intelligence. There is no single performance metric that forces collaboration. There is no single map that shows the country’s criminal geography in real time.
To fix this, I strongly advise the immediate establishment of a Presidential Security Operations and Intelligence Fusion Centre that receives live incident data from every security agency and state command.
The fusion centre should not be a ceremonial television room. It must be the national nerve centre where attacks, kidnappings, rescue operations, forest camps, arms routes, informant reports, ransom channels, illegal mining sites and displaced communities are mapped on one geospatial dashboard.
It works through data ingestion, geospatial mapping, command clarity, and outcome-based accountability. Every agency feeds real-time data into a secure cloud platform: incident reports, SIGINT, HUMINT, financial intelligence, telco data, border crossing records, customs seizures. GIS layers show hotspots, supply routes, safe houses, and population density. Machine learning flags patterns: repeated SIM numbers in ransom calls, clusters of suspicious transactions, movement of vehicles linked to prior incidents.
One national coordinator reports directly to the Presidency through the National Security Adviser/Homeland Security Adviser. Every agency contributes data without hoarding intelligence. Hoarding becomes a disciplinary offense. Commanders are assessed by measurable outcomes – response time, rescued victims, arrests, prosecutions, recovered weapons, reopened roads, safe farms and community confidence. Not by press releases.
Within 90 days, Nigeria must create a 24/7 national incident dashboard with state-by-state threat mapping, mandate real-time intelligence sharing among military, police, DSS, NIA, NSCDC, EFCC, NFIU, Customs, Immigration and state security desks, introduce a daily security performance brief for the Presidency and a weekly operational review for agency heads, and link the fusion centre to emergency hotlines, drone feeds, satellite imagery, bank and telco intelligence requests and community reports. Without this, Nigeria will continue to fight 36 separate wars against one networked enemy.
Forests, reserves, mining belts and border communities have become sanctuaries for kidnappers, bandits and insurgent cells. The repeated mistake is a raid-and-withdraw mentality: troops enter, camps are destroyed, statements are issued, and criminals return when the pressure drops.
This pattern produces public relations victories but not territorial control. It is the difference between clearing and holding. The doctrine must be clear, hold, build and govern.
Clear means intelligence-led operations to disrupt criminal command structures, food, fuel, arms, informant and ransom supply lines. Hold means establishing permanent forward operating bases near strategic corridors, not just military camps, but mixed formations of police, agro-rangers, and civil defence. Build means immediately deploying non-military follow-through: police posts, mobile courts, local administrators, humanitarian support, school reopening teams, health workers and community liaison officers. Govern means restoring legitimate state presence where taxes are collected, disputes adjudicated, markets reopened, schools functional.
A recovered forest without governance is a temporary military footprint, not a reclaimed state asset. When civilians see that the state leaves after the cameras leave, they will not give intelligence. They will hedge their bets with the criminals who stay. Operational success depends on targeting discipline, supply line interdiction, and local knowledge. Bad targeting creates fresh grievances and recruitment opportunities for violent actors. Every strike must be law-compliant and civilian-protection conscious. Control fuel, food, motorcycle, ammunition, SIM card and medical supply flows into known criminal corridors. This requires customs, road transport unions, and market associations as partners. Use vetted local scouts who know the terrain, language, and clan dynamics. External forces alone cannot hold ground.
In 90 days, Nigeria must rank the top 50 criminal forest and rural sanctuaries using intelligence and incident data, deploy drones, aerial surveillance, ground reconnaissance and vetted local scouts under professional command, establish hold zones with forward operating bases, mobile police units, agro-rangers and community liaison officers, and control fuel, food, motorcycle, ammunition, SIM card and medical supply flows into known criminal corridors. The goal is to make it psychologically and logistically impossible for criminal groups to believe they can return and operate with impunity.
Checkpoints alone do not build security. In many communities, they have become symbols of extortion, delay and distrust. Criminals often know how to bypass, bribe or study checkpoints. Citizens, meanwhile, may hesitate to report threats because they fear retaliation, exposure, or mistreatment by security personnel. Security is a function of trust. If the community does not trust the security agent, the agent will never get the intelligence needed to prevent the next attack.
The shift must be toward community safety architecture. Real community policing means officers know the terrain, speak the language, understand local disputes, protect informants, respond quickly and build confidence. Security stakeholders must convert traditional rulers, religious leaders, market unions, transport groups, youth associations, women leaders, school authorities and local vigilantes into structured security partners. This must be professionalised.
Community policing should not become mob justice or ethnic militia activity. Local volunteers and constabularies must be vetted, registered, trained, supervised and held accountable. Their role is to generate intelligence, support early warning and guide lawful response – not replace the Police or the courts. A community that trusts its police will report the stranger who rents a house and never goes out. A community that fears its police will hide that stranger because they fear the police more.
Within 90 days, create Community Safety Compacts in every high-risk local government area with written agreements between communities and security agencies on roles, responsibilities, and grievance mechanisms. Replace indiscriminate checkpoints with intelligence-led patrol grids and quick-response units. Protect informants through confidential reporting systems and relocation support where necessary. Train local constabularies and vigilante support groups under police supervision and human-rights rules. Train the Police Supernumerary Officers and use them as Technical Intelligence Support operatives. The metric of success is not the number of checkpoints. It is the number of actionable tips received per week from civilians.
Kidnapping has matured into a criminal economy. It has recruiters, informants, drivers, guards, food suppliers, arms suppliers, negotiators, ransom collectors, money launderers and political protectors. A purely kinetic response that targets only gunmen in the bush leaves the business model intact. You can kill 20 foot soldiers, but if the financier is untouched and the payment channel is open, 20 more will be recruited next week.
The response must treat kidnapping like organized financial crime. Every ransom has a route. Every ransom collector uses communication. Every long-term camp needs supplies. Every gang has a logistics spine. Security stakeholders must follow the money, follow the phones, follow the fuel, follow the cattle-market links, follow the illegal mining proceeds and follow the suspicious cash movements.
This strategy requires the Police, DSS, EFCC, NFIU, NCC, CBN, banks, fintechs, telcos, Customs and Immigration to work from one kidnap-for-ransom intelligence file. The goal is to make kidnapping unprofitable, traceable and operationally dangerous for financiers and facilitators. Use court-authorised access to bank records, fintech wallets, POS transaction logs. Freeze accounts within 24 hours of identification. Conduct SIM registration audits, call data records, cell site analysis to identify burner phones and repeat ransom numbers. Identify fuel stations, food suppliers, and motorcycle dealers supplying known camps. Use satellite imagery to verify activity. Use non-conviction based asset forfeiture against facilitators. Seize motorcycles, vehicles, and properties used in operations.
In 90 days, create a Kidnap Economy Disruption Task Force combining investigators, financial analysts, telco analysts and prosecutors. Build a national database of incidents, victim profiles, ransom demands, payment channels, negotiator numbers and suspect networks. Use court-authorised financial tracing, SIM audits, suspicious transaction reports and asset-freezing orders against facilitators. Target the logistics ecosystem: fuel suppliers, food suppliers, arms channels, informants, ransom couriers and corrupt intermediaries. By Day 30, the national kidnap database should be operational and linked to the fusion centre. By Day 60, assets and accounts linked to ransom logistics should be frozen. By Day 90, there should be a measurable drop in ransom payments and an increase in rescued victims. When kidnapping stops paying, the business collapses.
Not all violence has the same cause. Some attacks are driven by profit; others by ideology, land pressure, revenge, identity wounds, displacement and historical injustice. In the Middle Belt and other flashpoints, unresolved farmer-herder conflict and minority grievances create openings for armed groups, vigilantes and criminal entrepreneurs. If you only shoot at the symptoms, the disease spreads.
Nigeria needs a national emergency response to land, livelihood and grievance conflicts that combines security with mediation, documentation, restitution and justice. Communities must see that government is not choosing ethnic sides; government is protecting citizens, restoring livelihoods, prosecuting killers and preventing revenge cycles. A serious peace process must map destroyed communities and disputed land, cattle routes, grazing reserves, water points, displaced households and their origins, local militia structures and patterns of retaliatory violence. The rule must be justice plus reconciliation – not reconciliation without accountability. Amnesty without justice breeds contempt. Justice without reintegration breeds revenge.
Within 90 days, establish a Presidential Land, Livelihood and Peace Mission for the North-Central and other flashpoint belts. Deploy mobile mediation teams, peace courts, victim documentation units and compensation mechanisms. Secure return corridors for displaced communities and protect both farmers and lawful pastoralists. Prosecute attackers, arsonists, weapons suppliers and community leaders who incite violence. Peace without justice is a ceasefire. Justice without peace is a trial. Nigeria needs both, simultaneously.
A hungry and unemployed society is vulnerable to recruitment, riots, theft and violent manipulation. Insecurity is now a food-security crisis. When farmers cannot access land, food prices rise. When markets are unsafe, supply chains shrink. When youths cannot earn, recruitment into gangs, extremist cells, drug distribution and political violence becomes easier. Security stakeholders must therefore treat agriculture and employment as security interventions, not only economic policies.
Farmers should not be asked to risk death to feed the nation. Agro-rangers, police patrols, civil defence units, community scouts and emergency response teams should protect planting, harvesting, storage and transportation. This must be paired with youth livelihood programmes that pay young people to rebuild communities, repair roads, support farms, clean markets, collect data and provide lawful local logistics. The youth component must be transparently managed. It should not become a political militia or patronage scheme. Participants must be registered, trained, paid digitally and supervised by civilian and security authorities.
In 90 days, identify and secure priority farm corridors in Benue, Plateau, Kaduna, Niger, Zamfara, Borno, Yobe and other exposed food belts. Deploy agro-rangers, patrol teams, emergency hotlines and rural response vehicles during planting and harvest seasons. Create a Youth Security and Livelihood Corps for lawful community stabilisation work. Tie food logistics to security mapping so that roads, storage facilities and markets receive protection based on risk. If a farmer can plant and harvest safely, food prices stabilize. If food prices stabilize, urban unrest reduces. If urban unrest reduces, police resources can focus on high-end crime. Everything is connected.
Doctrine without command is a suggestion. Doctrine with command becomes a campaign. The Presidential Security Operations and Intelligence Fusion Centre must be the single point of truth. No agency should brief the President without data from the fusion centre. This ends parallel briefings and parallel operations. A single classified geospatial dashboard accessible to all authorized agencies showing red zones, amber zones, green zones, updated hourly, ends the problem of different maps and different realities.
A National Security Operations Coordinator with direct access to the President and authority to task resources across agencies ends the “that’s not my mandate” problem. Ten coordinated strategies must cover the fusion centre, sanctuaries, community policing, ransom economy, land and grievance, secure farm corridors, border control, cyber and fraud, oil theft, separatist violence, and public communications. The public must see measurable action. Not promises. Metrics released weekly: number of rescues, number of arrests, kilometers of road reopened, tons of food moved safely, hectares planted under protection.
A security reset cannot become a human rights crisis. The same intelligence that catches a kidnapper can be abused to target a journalist. The same fusion centre that coordinates rescues can be used for political surveillance. Guardrails are essential. All phone taps, financial seizures, and data requests require court authorization within 48 hours. Civil society and NHRC observers should be embedded in the fusion centre with access to redacted data. Secure channels must exist for officers to report abuse without retaliation. Monthly declassified reports on operations, outcomes, and complaints must be published. Security without legitimacy is temporary. Legitimacy without security is impossible.
The public will not accept process. They want results they can see and feel. Success at Day 90 means a 30% reduction in kidnapping incidents in target states, over 100 victims rescued and reunited, 50+ criminal financiers’ assets frozen, 20 farm corridors secured and planted, 10 roads reopened for commercial traffic, 5 criminal sanctuaries permanently occupied and governed, and community trust surveys showing a 40% increase in willingness to report crime. These are not miracles. They are the product of discipline, data, and command clarity.
Nigeria can continue to treat insecurity as 774 separate local problems. If it does, the criminal ecosystem will continue to grow, adapt, and outpace the state. Or Nigeria can treat it as one war, fought on one map, under one command, with ten coordinated strategies, for 90 days of disciplined deployment.
The Presidency provides the political will. The security agencies provide the operational discipline. The communities provide the intelligence and legitimacy. The private sector provides the technology and logistics.
This is not about new weapons. Nigeria has enough guns. This is about a new way of using the information, authority, and trust that already exists. The cost of inaction is measured in lives, in hunger, in displaced children, and in a nation losing faith in the idea of itself. The cost of action is 90 days of focused work. The choice is now.
*Prof. Abiola Allen is a Professor of Forensic Criminology and Investigations | Strategy Specialist (Harvard) | ICAN Certified Forensic/Chartered Accountant | Certified Fraud Examiner | ICAN Certified Sustainable and ESG Reporting Professional | Certified Agentic AI Professional | Oracle Certified Database Administrator/Application Developer | Cisco Certified Network Professional. He can be reached on 234-9094787870 WhatsApp Only.
